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Abstract 
We study optimal public rationing of an indivisible good and private sector price response. Consumers 
differ in their wealth and cost of provisions. Due to a limited budget, some consumers must be 
rationed. Public rationing determines the characteristics of consumers who seek supply from the 
private sector, where a firm sets prices based on consumer cost information and in response to the 
rationing rule. We consider two inforrmation regimes. In the first, the public supplier rations 
consumers according to their wealth information. In equilibrium, the public supplier must ration both 
rich and poor consumers. Supplying all poor consumers would leave only rich consumers in the 
private market, and the firm would react by setting a high price. Rationing some poor consumers is 
optimal, and implements price reduction in the private market. In the second information regime, the 
public supplier rations consumes according to consumer wealth and cost information. In equilibrium, 
rationing is based on cost-effectiveness and consumers are allocated the good if and only if their costs 
are below a threshold. 
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1 Introduction
Rationing of services and goods such as health, education and housing by a public supplier is very common.
Free public supply often coexists with active private markets. Rationing and public supply are two sides of
the same action. When the public supplier provides a good for free to some consumers, rationed consumers
may consider purchasing from the private sector at their own expense. Rationing therefore determines the
portfolio of consumers in the private market. A private firm must recognize this, and choose its pricing
strategy accordingly. In this paper we study how rationing aﬀects prices in these private markets and
characterize the optimal rationing policy.
The analysis of how the market reacts to a public program is crucial to the design of an optimal policy.
It is well documented in the public finance literature that public programs often crowd out purchases in the
private market. Consider the health sector. Since the seminal paper by Gruber and Cutler (1996), many
studies have tried to measure the extent to which the expansion of public health programs targeted towards
the less wealthy patients, such as Medicaid, crowds out private insurance coverage. In the last twenty years
in the US, the number of uninsured but also publicly insured individuals has risen (see Gruber and Simon,
2008). Despite the lack of consensus about the magnitude of the crowding-out eﬀect, the majority of studies
agree that part of the rise in the number of publicly insured individuals can be explained by the fall in the
number of privately insured ones. A policy aimed at reducing the number of the uninsured cannot ignore
the impact on and the reaction of the private market.
A reactive private market cannot be modeled as a perfectly competitive market. Suppose that a public
supplier provides for free to some eligible consumers a given quantity of an indivisible good, which is also
traded in a perfectly competitive market. If the supply curve is not perfectly inelastic, the leftward shift in
the demand curve would lead to a lower equilibrium price and quantity. However, the equilibrium quantity
falls by less than the increase in the quantity supplied for free by the public supplier. Therefore, the total
number of consumers who get the good after the policy is implemented necessarily increases. Crowding out
cannot be explained by the assumption that the firms in the market are price takers. Our model provides a
general framework for studying the design of an optimal rationing policy when the private market is modeled
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as a monopoly. It could be used to understand the mechanisms behind the crowding-out of private purchases
due to the expansion of free public provision in the health sector. Cutler and Gruber [1996] suggests some
"mechanisms through which employer-provided coverage could fall as Medicaid eligibility increases". Among
these, they consider a price (premium) rise in the private market. More precisely, they suggest that employers
may reduce their contribution to insurance premiums, or that "as Medicaid coverage rises, providers may
maintain their incomes by charging higher prices to privately insured patients, lowering the demand for
private insurance ." A price-reactive private market is hence consistent with a plausible explanation of the
crowding out eﬀect.
In our model, consumers are heterogenous in two dimensions. The costs of providing the good to them
diﬀer and they have diﬀerent wealth levels. Consumers wealth heterogeneity is natural, and more wealthy
consumers may be more willing to pay for services. In the health market, cost heterogeneity is common.
Patients with higher severity levels are more costly to treat. This is also true in education. The cost of
educating a student depends on the student’s aptitude and other demographic factors. We consider the
supply of an indivisible good, and further standardize the unit so that it represents one unit of improvement
in well-being. We then assume that its benefit is the same to all consumers. As an example, consider
a hip replacement procedure. Treating patients with higher levels of disability requires high costs. A
hip replacement will allow a consumer to walk about without pain, which we regard as a unit of health
improvement. Consumers who are more wealthy may be more willing to pay for the hip replacement.
Achieving literacy can be thought of as the good to be provided to students, and we normalize it so that
literacy represents a unit of benefit.
We consider the eﬀect of rationing on prices under two information regimes. In the first, the public
supplier observes consumer’ wealth level and can credibly commit to a rationing scheme based on consumer
wealth. In the second, the public supplier observes both consumer’ wealth and cost levels, and credibly
commits to a rationing scheme based on both pieces of information.
The public supplier has access to wealth information through tax returns. It may well have access to
and use cost information. This is our second information regime. We also consider the case where the
2
public supplier is unable to use cost information in our first information regime. In the health care market,
for example, clinicians may decide on medical services based on needs rather than costs. In the education
market, school districts are committed to provide education to all eligible students.
As already mentioned above, we model the private market as a monopoly. The firm does not observe
consumers’ wealth levels, but it does observe their cost characteristic and knows the rationing scheme im-
plemented by the public supplier. The firm chooses a price function based on cost.
Our model is unlike the typical regulation model, where the regulated, private firm has more information
than a social planner. In our model, a public supplier may even have more information than the private
firm. The critical issue we consider is how the allocation of the public supplier’s limited budget for consumers
aﬀects the private firm’s price responses.
Rationing defines which consumers are entitled to public provision. Suppose that rationing is based on
wealth, and poor consumers are supplied by the public while rich consumers are rationed. Only the rich
consumers will consider the private market. Anticipating that the consumers available in the market are rich
and have a high willingness to pay, a firm tends to raise prices. High prices will still be optimal even if the
costs of providing to these rich consumers are low. This is recognized as a form of cream-skimming.
In the health economics literature, cream-skimming usually refers to providers selecting of low-cost,
hence, profitable patients under a prospective payment system. This conception ignores the possibility that
consumers have diﬀerent willingness to pay, and this is important in a mixed system where the private
market is active. A high-cost, rich consumer may well be more profitable than a low-cost, poor consumer.
The price-cost margin for a rich consumer may be larger. In our model, cream-skimming means that the
firm can price discriminate according to the cost of provision and also that the firm uses information on the
supplier’s rationing policy to deduce whether the consumer on the market has high or low willingness to pay.
The public supplier can mitigate cream-skimming by using wealth information and by choosing the
proportion of poor and rich consumers in the market. If the public supplier rations some poor consumers,
making them available to the private market, a private firm may then find it attractive to lower prices when
consumers have good risks or low costs. The mixture of rich and poor consumers in the private market makes
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price reduction in the private sector an equilibrium response. This is the main result of the analysis under
the first information regime. Using total consumer utility as a welfare index, we show that in equilibrium,
the public supplier must ration both poor and rich consumers, and implement some price reduction in the
private sector.
Those concerned with equity may find rationing the poor disagreeable. Nevertheless, we show that
rationing some poor consumers will yield a first-order gain due to price reduction. Supplying all poor
consumers will exacerbate cream-skimming, eliminating this gain. Unless social preferences are so extreme
that only the welfare of poor consumers matters, the price reduction due to the rationing of some poor
consumers will be beneficial. However, we extend the analysis to consider the optimal policy of a public
supplier who has equity concerns and include welfare weights in the social welfare function.
In the second information regime, rationing is based on both wealth and cost information. Surprisingly,
in equilibrium the public supplier ignores the wealth information and rations consumers according to cost-
eﬀectiveness. All consumers with costs below a threshold are supplied, while those with higher costs are
rationed. Since the rationing scheme is independent of wealth, the firm cannot anticipate the wealth compo-
sition of consumers in the market. The firm cannot do better than setting prices as if the public sector did
not exist, although it must only sell to consumers with higher costs. The public supplier induces more price
reduction when rationing is based on wealth than when rationing is based on wealth and cost. We analyze
the eﬀect of the introduction of welfare weights in this second information regime too.
In Grassi and Ma (2008) we study a similar model, but the public rationing and private price schemes are
chosen simultaneously. That model oﬀers a longer term perspective on the interaction, because rationing and
price schemes must be mutual best responses. We find that when the public supplier observes consumers’
wealth and cost levels, it implements a rationing policy based on cost-eﬀectiveness, the same as in the model
here. Under rationing based on wealth and cost information, equilibria are robust with respect to the public
supplier’s commitment power.
If rationing is only based on wealth, the game in Grassi and Ma (2008) has multiple equilibria, all of which
diﬀer from the equilibrium here. While the public supplier rationing the poor to induce price reduction is the
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equilibrium strategy in the sequential game, price reduction is never implemented in the simultaneous-move
game.
The literature on rationing and the private sector usually assumes an exogenous supply in the private
market. Barros and Olivella (2005) consider doctors who self-refer patients in the public sector to the private
sector. Prices paid by patients in the private sector are fixed, while doctors only refer low-cost patients.
Iversen (1997) studies waiting-time rationing when there is a private market. Hoel and Sæther (2003)
consider the eﬀect of competitive supplementary insurance on a national health insurance system. Hoel
(2007) derives the optimal cost-eﬀectiveness rule when patients have access to a competitive private market.
A competitive private market has been a common assumption.. This may be relevant in many settings, but
is unlikely to be true always. In fact, when the private market pricing rule is fixed, one only can study how
the private market influences public policies. By contrast, we study the case where public policies influence
private market responses.
Strategic interaction between the public and the private sectors is studied in the literature of mixed
oligopolies. A mixed oligopoly is defined as a market structure where a public enterprise coexists with one or
more profit-maximizing firms. See Cremer et al. (1991), DeFraja and Delbono (1990), Merrill and Schneider
(1966), Beato and Mas Colell (1984). Works in the mixed oligopoly literature use a variety of assumptions
on whether goods are homogeneous or diﬀerentiated, whether the public firm has a first-mover advantage,
and whether the public firm has some budget available in order to oﬀer goods at below costs. This literature
focuses on the markets for public utilities, such as telecommunication, transportation, water, and energy,
where mixed oligopolies are common. A mixed oligopoly is also common in the health care, education and
housing sectors. Issues of rationing and selection are especially relevant in the health care sector, but have
not been the focus of that literature. Our research connects between the analysis of mixed oligopoly and
rationing and selection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 and its subsections describe the
firm’s choice of the profit maximizing prices in the continuation equilibrium and the equilibrium rationing
when the public supplier observes only consumers’ wealth level. Section 4 and its subsections focus on the
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information regime where wealth and cost levels are observed by the public supplier. The last Section draws
some conclusions. An Appendix contains all proofs.
2 The model
There is a set of consumers. Each consumer’s wealth is either w1 or w2, with w1 < w2. Let mi > 0 be
the mass of consumers with wealth wi, i = 1, 2. We call consumers with wealth w1 poor consumers, and
consumers with wealth w2 rich consumers.
Each consumer may consume at most one unit of an indivisible good. If a consumer pays a price p for
the good, his utility is U(wi − p) + 1, while if he does not consume the good (and pays 0), his utility is
U(wi). The function U is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The good gives a unit utility increment
to a consumer. We can use a general utility function where the utilities from consuming the good at price
p and from not consuming the good are U(w − p, 1) and U(w, 0), respectively. A separable utility function
simplifies the analysis.
A consumer’s willingness to pay for the good, τ i, is defined by the following:
U(wi − τ i) + 1 = U(wi), i = 1, 2, (1)
so τ i is the maximum price a consumer with wealth wi is willing to pay. Because U is strictly concave,
τ1 < τ2; a rich consumer is more willing to pay for the good than a poor consumer. Similarly, by the strict
concavity of U , for any p > 0, we have U(w2) − U(w2 − p) < U(w1) − U(w1 − p). It follows that a rich
consumer enjoys more surplus than a poor consumer when the good is sold at price p:
U(w1 − p) + 1− U(w1) < U(w2 − p) + 1− U(w2).
The cost of providing the good to a consumer is random. Let c denote this cost, G : [c, c] → [0, 1] its
distribution function, and g the corresponding density, both defined on a positive support, and with g > 0.
The distribution G is independent of wealth and uncorrelated to the utility benefit from consuming the
good, which is fixed at 1. In the health care example, this means that patients with diﬀerent severity levels
obtain the same incremental utility from the good. Furthermore, we assume that the hazard rate G(c)/g(c)
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is increasing. Let γ be the expected value of c. We assume that c < τ1 < c ≤ τ2. The last, weak inequality
involves no loss of generality because a firm attempting to sell to any consumer with cost higher than τ2 will
not make any sale.
A public supplier has a budget B which is insuﬃcient to provide the good for free to all consumers, so
we assume B < (m1 + m2)γ. We consider two information regimes. In the first, the public supplier can
use a non-price rationing mechanism based on wealth. In the second, the public supplier uses a non-price
rationing mechanism based on both wealth and cost. There is also a private market, and we model it as a
monopoly. The private firm does not observe consumers’ wealth but does observe their costs.
When rationing is based on consumers’ wealth, a rationing policy is given by (θ1, θ2), 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2.
For each wealth class wi, the regulator rations θimi consumers, and supplies (1 − θi)mi consumers. When
rationing is based on consumers’ wealth and costs, a rationing policy is given by (φ1, φ2), a pair of functions
φi(c) : [c, c]→ [0, 1], i = 1, 2. The value φi(c)g(c) is the density of consumers with wealth wi and cost c who
are rationed. For consumers with wi, the mass of rationed consumers with cost less than c is
mi
Z c
c
φi(x)g(x)dx,
and the mass of supplied consumers with cost less than c is
mi
Z c
c
[1− φi(x)]g(x)dx.
Consumers who are rationed may consider buying from the private market. The public supplier’s payoﬀ is
the sum of consumer utilities.
There is a private market and we model it as a monopoly. The firm observes a consumer’s cost c , but
not his wealth wi. In our model, if the firm managed to observe both consumers’ wealth and cost, it would
extract all consumer surplus. Given the public supplier’s rationing policy, the private firm chooses prices as
a function of costs to maximize profits.
We study the subgame-perfect equilibria of the following extensive-form games:
Stage 0: Nature determines that a mass mi of consumers have wealth wi, i = 1, 2, and draws a cost
realization for each consumer according to the distribution G. The private firm observes a consumer’s
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cost realization, but not his wealth. Under rationing based on wealth, the public supplier observes a
consumer’s wealth, but not the cost realization. Under rationing based on wealth and cost, the public
supplier observes a consumer’s wealth and cost.
Stage 1: Under rationing based on wealth, the public supplier sets a rationing policy (θ1, θ2), 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1,
supplying (1−θi)mi consumers with wealth wi, i = 1, 2. Under rationing based on wealth and cost, the
public supplier sets a rationing policy (φ1, φ2), φi(c) : [c, c]→ [0, 1], supplying [1−φi(c)]mi consumers
with wealth wi and cost c.
Stage 2: The private firm sets a price for each cost realization.
Stage 3: Consumers who are rationed by the public supplier may purchase from the private firm at the
prices set at Stage 2.
3 Equilibrium rationing and prices in wealth-based rationing
3.1 Continuation equilibrium prices
For a given rationing policy (θ1, θ2), we derive the firm’s continuation equilibrium prices in Stage 2. Because
consumers are either poor or rich, the firm will set its price to either τ1 or τ2. Clearly at any cost above τ1,
the firm must set the price at τ2, selling only to rich consumers. Suppose that the cost c decreases below τ1.
The firm may set a low price τ1, selling to both rich and poor consumers, or a high price τ2, selling only to
rich consumers; these profits are respectively:
π(τ1; c ≤ τ1) ≡ (m1θ1 +m2θ2)[τ1 − c] (2)
π(τ2; c ≤ τ1) ≡ m2θ2[τ2 − c]. (3)
The profits in (2) and (3) are linear in c, and (2) decreases in c at a faster rate than (3); these functions
are illustrated in Figure 1. For some rationing policies (θ1, θ2) there may be a cost level c1 < τ1 in [c, c] such
that π(τ1; c1) = π(τ2; c1), as in Figure (1). This value of c1 is given by
c1 ≡ τ1 −
m2θ2
m1θ1
(τ2 − τ1). (4)
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As the cost drops below τ1, a price reduction is worthwhile only if there are enough poor consumers relative
to rich ones. The value of c1 is the cost threshold at which a price reduction occurs and is decreasing in the
ratio of available rich to poor consumers,
m2θ2
m1θ1
. If there are few poor consumers in the market, the cost
has to be much lower than τ1 for a price reduction to occur. In an extreme, if only the rich consumers are
rationed and all the poor are supplied by the public sector, the firm will not reduce the price at all. We
summarize the firm’s continuation equilibrium prices by the following:
Lemma 1 Given a rationing scheme (θ1, θ2), in a continuation equilibrium if c1 in (4) is greater than c,
the firm sets the high price τ2 if c > c1, and the low price τ1 if c < c1; if c1 in (4) is less than c, the firm
always sets the high price τ2.
( ) )( 12211 cmm −+ τθθ
)( 222 cm −τθ
1c 2τ1τ
c
)(cπ
c
Figure 1: Comparison of profit between setting high and low prices
We should rule out any situation where the cost has no influence on prices when the budget is zero. For
this, we assume that when all consumers are rationed because B = 0, the firm switches from low to high
price at an interior cost threshold. That is, at θ1 = θ2 = 1 in (4) there is cm in the interior of [c, c], where
cm = τ1 −
m2
m1
(τ2 − τ1). (5)
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3.2 Equilibrium rationing
We introduce a new notation β ≡ B/γ. Because B denotes the budget available to the public supplier and
γ the expected cost, the term β is the number of consumers to whom the public supplier can provide the
good. Given the continuation equilibrium prices, the total consumer utility is:
m1
⎡
⎣(1− θ1) (U(w1) + 1) + θ1
⎧
⎨
⎩
c1Z
c
[U(w1 − τ1) + 1] dG+
cZ
c1
U(w1) dG
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎤
⎦+
m2
⎡
⎣(1− θ2) (U(w2) + 1) + θ2
⎧
⎨
⎩
c1Z
c
[U(w2 − τ1) + 1] dG+
cZ
c1
[U(w2 − τ2) + 1] dG
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎤
⎦ .
In this expression, terms involving (1 − θi) are consumers’ utilities when they receive the public supply
at no charge. Terms involving θi are the market outcomes. For poor consumers, if their costs are below
c1, they purchase at τ1, which actually leaves them no surplus (see definition of τ i in (1)). Similarly, for
rich consumers, if their costs are above c1, they purchase at price τ2, earning no surplus. However, if rich
consumers’ costs are below c1, they earn a surplus U(w2 − τ1) + 1− U(w2) > 0, since the price τ1 is lower
than their willingness to pay τ2.
Using U(wi − τ i) + 1 = U(wi), i = 1, 2, we simplify the previous expression to
[m1U(w1) +m2U(w2) +m1(1− θ1) +m2(1− θ2)] +m2θ2
c1Z
c
[U(w2 − τ1) + 1− U(w2)] g(c)dc, (6)
where c1 ≥ c characterizes the firm’s continuation equilibrium price strategy. The termm1(1−θ1)+m2(1−θ2)
is the total number of consumers receiving public supply, while U(w2− τ1)+ 1−U(w2) is the surplus a rich
consumer enjoys when he purchases at price τ1. In an equilibrium the budget B must be exhausted. Hence,
we replace m1(1− θ1) +m2(1− θ2) by β, and simplify (6) to
V (θ2, c1) ≡ [m1U(w1) +m2U(w2) + β] +m2θ2
c1Z
c
[U(w2 − τ1) + 1− U(w2)] g(c)dc. (7)
An equilibrium is a rationing policy (θ1, θ2) and the continuation equilibrium price strategy in Lemma 1
c1 that maximize (7)), subject to the cost threshold definition (4), the budget constraint
m1(1− θ1) +m2(1− θ2) ≤ β ≡
B
γ
(< m1 +m2), (8)
and the boundary conditions c ≤ c1, and 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2.
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Proposition 1 In the equilibrium, the public supplier rations consumers in each wealth class: θ1 > 0 and
θ2 > 0, while the firm charges the low price τ1 when the consumer’s cost is below a threshold c∗1, where
c < c∗1 < τ1.
Proposition 1 (whose proof is in the appendix) says that for any budget, the public supplier must ration
some poor consumers and some rich consumers. Only rich consumers potentially gain from the private
market, so rationing some rich consumers must be an equilibrium. The gain will not be realized if the
firm does not reduce the price. To realize this potential gain, the public supplier must leave enough poor
consumers in the market so that the ratio between rich and poor consumers makes it attractive for the private
firm to reduce the price. Therefore, the equilibrium cost threshold c1 at which the price drops from τ2 to
τ1 must be strictly above c. We emphasize that rationing of consumers occurs in equilibrium even if the
budget is suﬃcient to provide for an entire class of consumers. The following characterizes the equilibrium
cost threshold c1, and the rationing policy (θ1, θ2).
Proposition 2 If the budget B is suﬃciently large, the value of c∗1 is given by the unique solution of
G(c∗1)
g(c∗1)
=
(τ1 − c∗1) (τ2 − c∗1)
τ2 − τ1
,
θ1 < 1, and θ2 < 1; the public supplier supplies some consumers in each wealth class. If the budget is
small, either θ1 or θ2 may be equal to 1 and the public supplier may ration an entire wealth class; the budget
constraint then can be used to solve for the optimal rationing policy.
Proposition 2 (whose proof is in the appendix) reports that there are three possible rationing outcomes.
In the “interior” solution, the value of c1 is obtained by the appropriate first-order conditions, and the
boundary conditions θi ≤ 1 do not bind. In the “corner” solutions, either θ1 = 1 or θ2 = 1.
The maximization of the objective function in (7) is equivalent to the maximization of
m2θ2 [U(w2 − τ1) + 1− U(w2)]G(c1).
This expression describes the surplus earned by the fraction θ2 of rationed rich consumers with cost below
the threshold c1. The inframarginal gain is constant, and the optimization problem is equivalent to the
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even simpler maximization of m2θ2G(c1). This objective function is increasing in both θ2 and c1, but the
equilibrium price and budget constraints, respectively (4) and (8), and the boundary conditions θi ≤ 1 limit
how high θ2 and c1 can be.
1 1mθ
1m
2 2m θ
1 1 2 2 1 2m m m mθ θ β+ = + − 1 1
2 2 1 1
2 1
cm m τθ θ τ τ
⎡ ⎤−= ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
2m
Figure 2: Budget and cost threshold constraints; boundary conditions.
The constraints are graphed in Figure 2. The downward sloping line is the budget constraint (8), while
the upward sloping line through the origin is the equilibrium cost threshold (4) for some c1; as the value of
c1 increases, the line becomes flatter. The two dotted lines are the boundary constraints for θi.
By solving for θ1 and θ2 with (4) and (8), and then substituting into the objective function, we have
the objective function expressed in terms of c1 alone, and then after ignoring constants, we can write it as
τ1 − c1
τ2 − c1
G(c1). (Details are in the proof.) The equilibrium value c∗1 in the Proposition achieves the maximum
of this objective function with the boundary conditions θi ≤ 1 ignored.
The value of c∗1 balances the trade-oﬀ between rationing more rich consumers and rationing more poor
consumers. Rationing a rich consumer allows him to realize a surplus if his cost is below the cost threshold.
Rationing a rich consumer, however, implies supplying a poor consumer. With fewer poor consumers in the
market, the cost has to fall below a lower c1 threshold before the private firm reduces its price. This then
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reduces the likelihood G(c1) that a rich consumer will benefit from the private market.
Clearly, c∗1 is the equilibrium value when the boundary conditions θi ≤ 1 are satisfied. In this case we
can use the budget and cost threshold constraints to solve for θi after setting c1 to c∗1, and both θ1 and θ2
are smaller than 1:
θ1 =
m1 +m2 − β
m1
∙
1 +
G(c∗1)
g(c∗1)
1
τ2 − c∗1
¸ < 1 and θ2 = m1 +m2 − β
m2
∙
1 +
g(c∗1)
G(c∗1)
(τ2 − c∗1)
¸ < 1. (9)
(Details of the computation are in the proof in the Appendix.) Figure 2 illustrates such a case where the
intersection of the budget and cost threshold constraints (at c1 = c∗1) is in the interior of the area bounded
by the boundary conditions represented by the two dotted lines.
The boundary conditions are unlikely to bind when the budget is big, so that in Figure 2, the budget
line is located closer to the origin. If the budget is small, the budget line is located farther from the origin.
One of the two boundary conditions may be violated when c1 is set at c∗1. In this case, the unconstrained
maximization of
τ1 − c1
τ2 − c1
G(c1) is infeasible. Instead, the intersection points between the budget line and the
boundary conditions must be considered. Either θ1 = 1 or θ2 = 1. Then, the value of cost threshold c1 can
be obtained by the constraint (4).
From (9), we can see that the total number of consumers mi in a wealth class will likely determine
whether that group will be completely rationed when the budget is small. We can also see this in Figure
2. If the value of m1 is small, then the vertical dotted line is closer to the origin. It is more likely that θ1
becomes 1. That is, to implement a cost reduction, the public supplier may have to let the private supplier
potentially sell to all poor consumers. Conversely, if m2 is small, then the horizontal dotted line is closer to
the origin. It is more likely that θ2 becomes 1. In this case, the public supplier finds it optimal to let all rich
consumers gain from trading in the private market.
How do our results change when the public supplier is concerned with equity? If the public supplier
is more concerned with the poor, we may let the public supplier’s payoﬀ be a weighted sum of poor and
rich consumers’ utilities, with a weight 1 +  for poor consumers and 1 for rich consumers, where  ≥ 0.
Formally, we simply replace m1 in (6) by m1(1 + ). Then the equilibrium will be given by the solution for
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the maximization of this modified objective function subject to the budget and cost-threshold constraints,
as well as the boundary conditions.
By the Maximum Theorem, the solution is continuous in  so our results, Propositions 1 and 2, are robust:
a small increase of  from zero will only change the optimal rationing rule slightly, and in the case of corner
solutions, may not at all. The first-order condition that yields the solution c∗1 in Proposition 2 becomes
G(c1)
g(c1)
− 
∆g(c1)
=
(τ1 − c1) (τ2 − c1)
τ2 − τ1
so that the cost threshold at which price reduction occurs tends to
be lower. Generally, the concern for equity favors supplying poor consumers, reducing their presence in the
private market. Equity concern tends to reduce the likelihood of price reduction.
We conclude this section by describing two benchmarks. The first is when there is no active private
market. The second is when the private market is competitive so that prices there are always equal to
costs. If there is no active private market, any rationing policy that exhausts the budget is optimal. Each
consumer benefits a unit of utility from the good, irrespective of his wealth level. The total increase in
expected consumer benefit is simply B/γ, or the total number of consumers who can be served by the
budget, and this is independent of how the budget is distributed to the consumers.
If there is a competitive private market, the unique equilibrium will have the budget first used to supply
poor consumers. If all poor consumers can be supplied, then the remaining budget will be used to supply a
fraction of rich consumers. This formal result can be found in Grassi and Ma (2008) for consumers having
a continuum of wealth levels, and it applies here. The intuition is this. Given that prices are always equal
to marginal costs, the regulator does not seek to influence pricing decisions in the private market. For any
given price in the private market, rich consumers benefit more than poor consumers. By rationing the rich
consumers, the public supplier allows more inframarginal gains from trade in the private market.
4 Equilibrium rationing and prices in wealth-cost based rationing
4.1 Continuation equilibrium prices
Given a rationing policy (φ1, φ2), φi(c) : [c, c] → [0, 1], we derive the continuation equilibria. Again, there
are only two possible equilibrium prices in the private market, the low price τ1 and the high price τ2.
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For any c > τ1, the unique best response by the private firm is τ2. For any c between c and τ1, the
firm chooses between the low price τ1 and the high price τ2. The firm’s profit from the low price τ1 is
[m1φ1(c) +m2φ2(c)][τ1 − c]; the profit is m2φ2(c)[τ2 − c] if the firm sets the high price τ2. Therefore, the
firm sets the low price τ1if [m1φ1(c) +m2φ2(c)][τ1 − c] ≥ m2φ2(c)[τ2 − c], or
m1φ1(c)[τ1 − c] ≥ m2φ2(c)[τ2 − τ1]. (10)
It sets a high price τ2 if (10) is violated, and it may randomize between τ1 and τ2 if (10) holds as an equality.
These are the continuation equilibrium prices.
We now define a new, indicator function for continuation equilibria when c < τ1. Let p : [c, τ1]→ [0, 1].
Given a policy (φ1, φ2), we set p(c) = 1 if (10) holds, p(c) = 0 if (10) is violated, and p(c) to a number
between 0 and 1 if (10) holds as an equality. The function p is the probability of price reduction when the
cost is between c and τ1. If p(c) takes the value 0, we understand it to mean no price reduction, and the
private firm chooses the high price τ2, whereas if p(c) takes the value 1, we understand it to mean a price
reduction, and the private firm chooses the low price τ1. If the value of p(c) is a fraction, the private firm
randomizes between the two prices.
Lemma 2 For c between c and τ1, any continuation equilibrium is given by a function p : [c, τ1] → [0, 1]
satisfying the following two inequalities:
p(c) {m1φ1(c)[τ1 − c]−m2φ2(c)[τ2 − τ1]} ≥ 0 (11)
[1− p(c)] {m1φ1(c)[τ1 − c]−m2φ2(c)[τ2 − τ1]} ≤ 0. (12)
Lemma 2 (whose proof is in the appendix) introduces a “complementary” function p(c) to describe
the continuation equilibria. The key to understanding continuation equilibria is whether at cost c a price
reduction will be implemented by the policy (φ1, φ2). Price reduction is a best response if (10) holds. The
term inside the curly brackets of (11) and (12) is the diﬀerence between the left-hand and right-hand sides of
(10). The variable p(c) is an indicator; it takes the value 1 when there is a price reduction, and 0 otherwise.
The inequalities (11) and (12) are complementary conditions that make p(c) and (10) consistent. By Lemma
2 , any equilibrium can be described by p : [c, τ1]→ [0, 1] satisfying (11) and (12).
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For ease of exposition , we extend the function p from the domain [c, τ1] to [c, c], and set p(c) = 0 for
c > τ1. This simply says that there is no price reduction for c > τ1. This extensions allows us to write
payoﬀs in a simpler way.
4.2 Equilibrium rationing
Given a rationing policy (φ1, φ2), φi(c) : [c, c]→ [0, 1], we have the continuation equilibrium given by Lemma
2. For values of c higher than τ1, the equilibrium price in the private sector must be τ2, and p(c) = 0. For
values of c less than τ1, consumers who are rationed may purchase from the private sector at the low price
when p(c) = 1 or at the high price when p(c) = 0. We now write the public supplier’s payoﬀ in the
continuation equilibrium:
Z c
c
{m1[1− φ1(c)][U(w1) + 1] +m2[1− φ2(c)][U(w2) + 1]}dG(c)
+
Z c
c
m1φ1(c) {[1− p(c)]U(w1) + p(c)[U(w1 − τ1) + 1}dG(c)
+
Z c
c
m2φ2(c) {[1− p(c)][U(w2 − τ2) + 1] + p(c)[U(w2 − τ1) + 1}dG(c).
In this expression, the first integral is the sum of the utilities of all those consumers supplied by the public
system; each consumer gets one unit of utility without incurring any cost. In the second integral, we write
the sum of the utilities of poor consumers who are rationed. A poor consumer who has cost c will encounter
a price reduction with probability p(c) (in a continuation equilibrium). If there is not a price reduction, the
poor consumer does not buy, so his payoﬀ is U(w1). If there is a price reduction, the poor consumer buys
at price τ1, hence the term U(w1 − τ1) + 1. In the last integral, we write the sum of the utilities of rich
consumers who are rationed. If there is not a price reduction, the rich consumer buys at τ2, hence the term
U(w2 − τ2) + 1. If there is a price reduction, he buys at τ1, hence the term U(w2 − τ1) + 1.
As in the case when rationing is based only on wealth information, the gain in utility when consumers
participate in the market is due to the rich consumers purchasing at the low price τ1. Poor consumers either
do not buy or buy at their reservation price τ1, gaining no surplus from the private market. This is clearly
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seen when we use the definitions of τ1 and τ2 to simplify the payoﬀ to:
m1U(w1) +m2U(w2) +
Z c
c
{m1[1− φ1(c)] +m2[1− φ2(c)]}dG(c)
+
Z c
c
m2φ2(c)p(c) [U(w2 − τ1) + 1− U(w2)]dG(c). (13)
In (13), the terms inside the first integral is the consumers’ utility gain from the public supply, and the terms
inside the second integral is the incremental gain of rationed rich consumers who purchase in the private
market at the low price τ1.
The optimal rationing policy is one that maximizes (13) subject to the budget constraint, and the
continuation equilibrium prices in the private market. By Lemma 2, the continuation equilibrium price is
given by p(c) satisfying (11) and (12). Ignoring the constant terms in (13), we write down the maximization
program for the public supplier’s equilibrium policy. Choose a policy (φ1, φ2) and the corresponding price
reduction function p to maximize
Z c
c
{m1[1− φ1(c)] +m2[1− φ2(c)]}dG(c) +
Z c
c
m2φ2(c)p(c) [U(w2 − τ1) + 1− U(w2)]dG(c) (14)
subject to
B −
Z c
c
{m1[1− φ1(c)] +m2[1− φ2(c)]} cdG(c) ≥ 0 (15)
p(c) {m1φ1(c)[τ1 − c]−m2φ2(c)[τ2 − τ1]} ≥ 0 (16)
[1− p(c)] {m1φ1(c)[τ1 − c]−m2φ2(c)[τ2 − τ1]} ≤ 0, (17)
and the boundary conditions 0 ≤ φi(c), p(c) ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, each c in [c, c], and p(c) = 0 for c > τ1. Call
this Program R. The budget constraint (15) says that the total expected cost from public supply must not
exceed the budget. For completeness, we have rewritten the two inequalities in Lemma 2 as (16) and (17).
Proposition 3 In the optimal rationing policy based on wealth and cost, the public supplier rations con-
sumers if and only if their costs are above a threshold. That is, in an equilibrium,
φ1(c) = φ2(c) = 0 for c < c
B
φ1(c) = φ2(c) = 1 for c > c
B,
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where the cost threshold cB is defined byZ cB
c
(m1 +m2)cdG(c) = B.
Figure 3 shows the three cases that make up the proof of Proposition 3 (which is in the appendix). In
all cases, the equilibrium rationing rule is based only on cost, not on wealth. Case 1 is where the budget
is large, suﬃcient to supply some consumers with cost above τ1. Here, all consumers in the private market
have costs higher than τ1, and the private firm sets the high price τ2. Poor consumers with high costs are
not provided with the good by the public supplier; nor are they willing to buy in the private market. Rich
consumers with high costs buy from the private market but earn no surplus.
Case 2 is where the budget is of medium size, lower than τ1 but higher than cm, where cm, defined in
(5), is the cost level below which the private firm sets the low price τ1 when all rich and poor consumers
are in the market. Here, as in Case 1, the price in the private market is always τ2. The public supplier
continues to provide for low-cost consumers. Even though there are some consumers with cost lower than
τ1, the private firm does not sell to them.
Finally, Case 3 is where the budget is small, less than cm. Here, the public supplier induces the private
firm to charge the low price τ1 when the cost is below cm. At higher costs, the price is set at τ2. A low price
in the private sector is an equilibrium if and only if the public supplier has a small budget.
Before we present the intuition behind Proposition 3, we present a benchmark where the private market
is inactive. Here, the public supplier chooses a rationing policy (φ1, φ2) to maximize consumer’s utility
subject to the budget constraint. This is actually a special case of this model: simply set p(c) = 0, and omit
constraints (16) and (17). The policy maximizing (14) (with p(c) = 0) subject only to the budget constraint
(15) is a simple cost-eﬀectiveness rule.1 Each consumer obtains a unit of utility, independent of his wealth
level. It is optimal to assign the good to those consumers with low costs. In other words, a consumer is
assigned the good if and only if his cost is below a threshold. The wealth information is irrelevant; quantity
rationing alone does not allow the public supplier to alter consumers’ wealth.
1The Lagrangean is L = m1[1 − φ1(c)] +m2[1− φ2(c)] + λ {B −m1[1− φ1(c)]c−m2[1− φ2(c)]c}, and the first-
order derivative with respect to φi is −mi(1− λc), which is increasing in c. Hence, when c is above a threshold, the
first-order derivative is positive, and φi = 1.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium rationing and price reduction
The surprising result in Proposition 3 is that the cost-eﬀectiveness rule continues to hold when the private
firm bases its monopoly pricing rule on costs. It is as if the public supplier had ignored the price reactive
private firm, and the private firm continued to use its monopoly pricing rule for the customers available.
How does this result come about?
Rationing consumers is equivalent to releasing them to the private market. When there are more poor
consumers in the private market, the private firm may reduce the price. When there are more rich consumers,
the private firm may not. Constraint (16) imposes conditions on the shares of rich and poor consumers for
a price reduction to be implemented. Constraint (17) imposes conditions on the share of rich and poor
consumers for a price increase to be implemented. Clearly, constraint (17) never binds -raising prices to
consumers is not in the public supplier’s interest- but constraint (16) may.
There are three factors aﬀecting the public supplier’s objective when rationing consumers. First, the
cost-eﬀectiveness principle continues to influence rationing policies; the public supplier tends to assign the
good to low-cost consumers. Second, rationing poor consumers tends to reduce the price, while rationing
rich consumers tends to raise the price. Rationing policies result in the private firm’s best responses, which
are in (16). Third, rationed rich consumers may gain inframarginal surplus if the price is low. This eﬀect is
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absent for poor consumers because the low price in the private market is their willingness to pay.
These three eﬀects can be seen from the first-order derivatives of the Lagrangean L of Program R with
respect to the rationing probabilities φ1 and φ2 (with the constraint (17) omitted). (The expression of L is
in the proof of the proposition in the appendix.) These derivatives are:
∂L
∂φ1
= −m1(1− λc) + μ(c)p(c)m1[τ1 − c] (18)
∂L
∂φ2
= −m2(1− λc)− μ(c)p(c)m2[τ2 − τ1] +m2p(c)∆, (19)
where ∆ ≡ [U(w2 − τ1) + 1− U(w2)] > 0 is the inframarginal gain for a rich consumer buying at the low
price, λ > 0 the multiplier for the budget constraint (15), and μ(c) ≥ 0 is the multiplier for the price-reduction
constraint (16) at c.
The common, first term −mi(1−λc) in (18) and (19) is the cost-eﬀectiveness principle. When c is small,
this tends to be negative, so rationing low-cost consumers is unattractive. The third term in (19) captures
the inframarginal gain for rich consumers. This is positive if and only if there is a price reduction, when
p(c) > 0. There is not such a corresponding term for the first-order derivative (18) for poor consumers, who
never obtain a surplus from the private market.
Each of the second terms in (18) and (19) involves the multiplier μ(c) for the price-reduction constraint
(16), and the probability of price reduction p(c). The interaction between price reduction and inframarginal
gain for rich consumers is the key to understanding Proposition 3. First, in (18), this term μ(c)p(c)m1[τ1−c]
is positive, and confirms the positive price-reduction eﬀect of rationing poor consumers. By contrast, in (19),
the term −μ(c)p(c)m2[τ2−τ1] is negative, and confirms the negative price eﬀect of rationing rich consumers.
The critical consideration in Proposition 3 is the conditions under which the public supplier would ration
both rich and poor consumers. Consider consumers with a given cost level c. If all poor consumers with cost
c are supplied, only rich consumers are in the market and the price is τ2, which yields no surplus for rich
consumers. If some but not all rich consumers with cost c are supplied, the inframarginal gain in the private
market is relevant. Price reduction and rationing of both rich and poor consumers must occur simultaneously
if the inframarginal gain is to be realized. When will this happen?
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In Case 1, the budget is large so that it is cost eﬀective to supply some consumers with costs above
τ1. Implementing a price reduction at a cost higher than τ1 is impossible. Implementing a price reduction
at a cost below τ1 yields less inframarginal surplus than the gain from the cost eﬀectiveness consideration.
Hence, there is never a price reduction under Case 1.
In Case 2, the budget may cover some consumers with costs above cm, but there is no price reduction
at costs below τ1. For this to happen, we must have (18) positive to that poor consumers are rationed.
Also, (19) must also be positive so that rich consumers would be rationed. The Lagrangean L is linear
in φi, and this implies that all rich and poor consumers are in the market. Nevertheless, at cost c > cm,
when all rich and poor consumes are in the market, the price-reduction constraint (16) is violated. To
implement price reduction requires supplying rich consumers, and this is the opposite of rationing them for
the inframarginal surplus. The conflict between the price-reduction and inframarginal eﬀects together means
that implementing price reduction is suboptimal.
In Case 3, the budget is very small. According to the cost eﬀectiveness principle, some consumers with
costs below cm are rationed. At these low costs, the private firm charges τ1 when all rich and poor consumers
are in the market. There is now no conflict between the price-reduction and inframarginal eﬀects. This is
then the only case when price reduction occurs in equilibrium.
Equity concern may lead the public supplier to ration rich consumers more often. Again, we can let the
public supplier’s payoﬀ be :
(1 + )m1U(w1) +m2U(w2) +
Z c
c
{(1 + )m1[1− φ1(c)] +m2[1− φ2(c)]}dG(c)
+
Z c
c
m2φ2(c)p(c) [U(w2 − τ1) + 1− U(w2)]dG(c). (20)
The optimal policy maximizes (20) subject to (15), (16), (17), and the boundary conditions 0 ≤ φi(c),
p(c) ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, each c in [c, c], and p(c) = 0 for c > τ1. By the Maximum Theorem, the solution is
continuous in . Therefore, Proposition 3 is robust.
When the public supplier is concerned with equity, the equilibrium rationing policies favor the poor.
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There are two cost thresholds, one for poor consumers, and another for the rich, respectively, cB1 and cB2,
with cB1 > cB2; consumers are rationed when their costs are higher than the respective levels, so poor
consumers are rationed less often then rich consumers.2
Figure 4 illustrates a case where some price reduction occurs. Compared to Case 3 in Figure 3, less poor
consumers are available in the private market, and the range of costs in which price reduction occurs has
shrunk.
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Figure 4: Price reduction with welfare weights.
5 Concluding remarks
We have presented a model for studying the eﬀect of rationing on prices in the private market. Public policies
should take into account market responses. We have shown that if rationing is based on wealth information,
the optimal policy must implement a price reduction in the private market. This is achieved by leaving some
poor consumers in the private market. If the public supplier observes consumers’ wealth and cost, optimal
rationing is based on cost-eﬀectiveness. This framework can be used by the policy maker in the design of
public programmes, for instance to anticipate common phenomena such as crowding-out.
The model has been simplified to discrete wealth levels to make the analysis tractable. Extending the
model and deriving the equilibrium rationing scheme for a general distribution of consumers’ wealth involve
more complex computation, but may well be worthwhile. Including quality diﬀerences between the public
2Equilibrium cB1 and cB2 are defined by these two equations: cB1/(1 + ) = cB2, and
U cB1
c m1cdG(c) +U cB2
c m2cdG(c) = B. The first equation is a cost eﬀectiveness tradeoﬀ adjusted by an equity concern. The sec-
ond equation is the budget constraint when all poor consumers with cost above cB1 and rich consumers with cost
above cB2 are rationed.
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and private sector may also be of interest.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Because all terms in square brackets in the objective function (7) are constant,
we can alternatively write the objective function as m2θ2G(c1).
The boundary conditions c ≤ c1, and 0 ≤ θi do not bind. If either θ2 = 0 or c1 = c at a solution, then
the optimized value is m2θ2G(c1) = 0. We show that a rationing policy with θ1 = θ2 = k > 0 does strictly
better. This policy satisfies the budget constraint (8) for some 0 < k < 1. Moreover, from (4) and (5), we
have c1 = cm > c by assumption. Therefore, this rationing policy, θ1 = θ2 = k, is feasible, and yields a
payoﬀ m2kG(cm) > 0. This implies that at a solution c1 > c and θ2 > 0. Because c1 > c, it follows from (4)
that θ1 must be bounded away from 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: From Proposition 1 we know that θi > 0 and c1 > c. For the time being,
ignore the (remaining) boundary conditions θi ≤ 1. Rewrite the budget constraint (8) as m1θ1 +m2θ2 ≥
m1+m2−β ≡ K > 0. Clearly, the budget constraint must bind at a solution. From constraint (4), we have
m2θ2(τ2 − τ1) = m1θ1(τ1 − c1), which yields
m1θ1 = m2θ2
τ2 − τ1
τ1 − c1
. (21)
Substituting this into the modified budget constraint, we can solve for m2θ2:
m2θ2 = K
τ1 − c1
τ2 − c1
. (22)
We next substitute (22) into the objective function m2θ2G(c1). The constrained maximization problem
(with the boundary conditions θi ≤ 1 omitted) is the same as the unconstrained maximization problem:
max
c1
K
τ1 − c1
τ2 − c1
G(c1).
Ignoring the parameter K, after simplification we obtain the first-order derivative
g(c1)
τ2 − c1
∙
(τ1 − c1)−
G(c1)
g(c1)
τ2 − τ1
τ2 − c1
¸
.
Setting the first-order derivative to zero, we have
G(c1)
g(c1)
=
(τ1 − c1) (τ2 − c1)
τ2 − τ1
. (23)
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The left-hand side of (23) is increasing in c1. For c1 between c and τ1, the right-hand side is decreasing. At
c1 = c, the left-hand side of (23) is zero, while the right-hand side of (23) is strictly positive. At c1 = τ1,
the left-hand side of (23) is strictly positive, while the right of (23) is zero. Therefore, there exists a unique
c∗1 strictly between c and τ1 that satisfies (23).
To recover θimi, we use (21) and (23) to get m2θ2 = m1θ1
G(c∗1)
g(c∗1) (τ2 − c∗1)
, which, together with the
budget constraint (8), can be used to solve for the values of m1θ1 and m2θ2:
m1θ1 =
m1 +m2 − β
1 +
G(c∗1)
g(c∗1)
1
τ2 − c∗1
and m2θ2 =
m1 +m2 − β
1 +
g(c∗1)
G(c∗1)
(τ2 − c∗1)
. (24)
If β is suﬃciently large, the right-hand side values in (24) will be less than m1 and m2, and the omitted
boundary conditions θi ≤ 1 are satisfied. Otherwise, if β is small, one or both of the right-hand side values
in (24) will be more than m1 or m2. In this case, a boundary condition binds. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider any continuation equilibrium. In this equilibrium, at cost c the firm
will charge either τ1 or τ2 depending on whether (10) is satisfied. If we have defined p using the method
indicated before the statement of the Lemma, inequalities (11) and (12) are satisfied.
Conversely, let a function p : [c, τ1] → [0, 1] satisfy inequalities (11) and (12). We show that it char-
acterizes a continuation equilibrium of policy (φ1, φ2). Suppose that p(c) = 1. Inequality (12) is satisfied
by any φ1(c) and φ2(c). Inequality (11) requires the term inside the curly brackets to be positive, and this
means that (10) is satisfied. Next, suppose that p(c) = 0. Inequality (11) is always satisfied. Inequality (12)
requires the term inside the curly brackets in (12) to be negative, and this means that (10) is violated. Last,
if p(c) is a number strictly between 0 and 1, both (11) and (12) must hold as equalities, so that (10) must
be an equality. Each value of p(c) satisfying (11) and (12) corresponds to a continuation equilibrium price.¥
Proof of Proposition 3: We use pointwise optimization to solve for the solution of Program R, which
is the optimal rationing policy. To do so, we consider a relaxed program in which constraint (17) is omitted;
we will show that in the solution of the relaxed program constraint (17) is satisfied. To simplify notation,
we multiply (16) by g(c), so that g(c) can be ignored for pointwise optimization. We also write ∆ ≡
U(w2 − τ1) + 1−U(w2). Let λ denote the multiplier for the budget constraint (15), and μ(c) the multiplier
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for (16) at c. The Lagrangean is
L = m1[1− φ1(c)] +m2[1− φ2(c)] +m2φ2(c)p(c)∆
+λ {B −m1[1− φ1(c)]c−m2[1− φ2(c)]c}
+μ(c)p(c) {m1φ1(c)[τ1 − c]−m2φ2(c)[τ2 − τ1]} ,
where we have omitted the boundary conditions on φi and p.
For c > τ1, p(c) = 0, so there is no need to optimize over p, and the first-order derivatives are
∂L
∂φ1
= −m1 + λm1c (25)
∂L
∂φ2
= −m2 + λm2c. (26)
For c < τ1, the first-order derivatives are
∂L
∂φ1
= −m1 + λm1c+ μ(c)p(c)m1[τ1 − c] (27)
∂L
∂φ2
= −m2 + λm2c− μ(c)p(c)m2[τ2 − τ1] +m2p(c)∆ (28)
∂L
∂p
= m2φ2(c)∆+ μ(c) {m1φ1(c)[τ1 − c]−m2φ2(c)[τ2 − τ1]} . (29)
We consider three cases, according to the size of the budget.
Case 1 is when the budget is large: cB > τ1; that is, the budget is suﬃcient to cover costs up to a level
above poor consumers’ willingness to pay τ1. To prove the proposition, we set λ =
1
cB
. Now consider c > cB.
The first-order derivatives (25) and (26) become −m1 +m1
c
cB
, and −m2 +m2
c
cB
, respectively. Both are
strictly positive. Hence it is optimal to set φi(c) = 1. Next, consider τ1 < c < cB. Then the first-order
derivatives (25) and (26) become strictly negative, and it is optimal to set φi(c) = 0.
Now consider c < c < τ1. We claim that φi(c) = p(c) = 0. At these values, the derivatives (27), (28), and
(29) are negative. At φi(c) = 0, the derivative (29) is zero; hence it is optimal to set p(c) = 0. At p(c) = 0,
(27) and (28) reduce to −m1 +m1
c
cB
, and −m2 +m2
c
cB
, respectively, and both are strictly negative. It is
optimal to set φi(c) = 0. Finally, the omitted constraint (17) is satisfied since φi(c) = 0.
Case 2 is when the budget cB is lower, between cm and τ1: cm < cB < τ1. Recall that cm is the cost
level at which the firm will set the low price τ1 if it has access to all consumers (m1[τ1− cm] = m2[τ2 − τ1],
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see also (5)). Again we set λ =
1
cB
. For c > τ1, the first-order derivatives (25) and (26) are −m1 +m1
c
cB
,
and −m2 +m2
c
cB
, respectively. Both are strictly positive. Hence it is optimal to set φi(c) = 1.
Next, consider cB < c < τ1. We set μ(c) to satisfy
m2∆+ μ(c) {m1[τ1 − c]−m2[τ2 − τ1]} = 0. (30)
Because c > cB > cm, we have m1[τ1 − c] < m2[τ2 − τ1]. Therefore, μ(c) > 0. We claim that p(c) = 0,
φi(c) = 1. Given p(c) = 0, the first-order derivatives (27) and (28) are −m1 +m1
c
cB
, and −m2 +m2
c
cB
,
respectively. Both are strictly positive. Hence it is optimal to set φi(c) = 1. Given φi(c) = 1, by the choice
of μ(c) satisfying (30), the derivative (29) is zero. Hence, setting p(c) = 0 is optimal. Obviously, the omitted
constraint (17) is satisfied since φi(c) = 1.
Next, consider c < c < cB. We claim that φi(c) = p(c) = 0. Given p(c) = 0, the first-order derivatives
(27) and (28) are both negative when c < cB . Hence it is optimal to set φi(c) = 0. Next, given that φi(c) = 0,
the derivative (29) is zero. Hence it is optimal to set p(c) = 0. Again, the omitted constraint (17) is satisfied
since φi(c) = 0.
Case 3 is when the budget is small, cB < cm. We set λ =
1
cB
. For c > τ1, we use the same argument as
in Case 1 and Case 2, and φi(c) = 1. For cm < c < τ1, we claim that φi(c) = 1 and p(c) = 0. We show this
using the same argument as in Case 2. When μ(c) is set to be suﬃciently large, the first-order derivative
(29) is zero, so that p(c) = 0 is optimal when φi(c) = 1. When p(c) = 0, setting φi(c) = 1 is optimal. The
omitted constraint (17) is satisfied because φi(c) = 1 and c > cm.
Next, for cB < c < cm, we claim that p(c) = 1 and φi(c) = 1. We set μ(c) = 0. When φi(c) = 1, the
first-order derivative (29) becomes
∂L
∂p
= m2∆ > 0,
and it is optimal to set p(c) = 1. Given p(c) = 1 and μ(c) = 0, first-order derivatives (27) and (28) are
strictly positive since cB < c. Hence, it is optimal to set φi(c) = 1. The omitted constraint (17) is satisfied
because p(c) = 1.
Finally, for c < c < cB, we claim that φi(c) = p(c) = 0. Given p(c) = 0, the first-order derivatives (27)
27
and (28) are strictly negative because c < cB. Hence it is optimal to set φi(c) = 0. Given φi(c) = 0, the
first-order derivative (29) is zero. It is optimal to set p(c) = 0. The omitted constraint (17) is satisfied
because φi(c) = 0. ¥
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